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AN EXPLORATORY INVESTIGATION OF EXTRINSIC AND INTRINSIC 
MOTIVATIONS IN TAX AMNESTY DECISION-MAKING 
 
Jonathan Farrar1, Cass Hausserman2 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The tax compliance literature on tax amnesties does not explicitly consider the underlying 
motivational influences on taxpayers’ self-correction decisions.  Extant tax amnesty studies imply 
that extrinsic motives are the basis for self-correction, and only a few consider intrinsic motives 
(Rechberger, Hartner, Kirchler & Hämmerle, 2010; Torgler & Schaltegger, 2005).  Consequently, 
we explore how extrinsic and intrinsic motives affect tax amnesty decision-making, following an 
unintentional taxpayer error. We conduct a quasi-experimental conjoint analysis on 1,266 
taxpayers and vary the error magnitude. Results indicate that when taxpayers contemplate making 
a tax amnesty disclosure, desire to avoid a penalty is the most influential extrinsic motive, and 
responsibility to pay one’s taxes is the most influential intrinsic motive.  Extrinsic (intrinsic) 
influences account for about two-thirds (one-third) of the overall decision to make a tax amnesty 
disclosure. We also find that taxpayers’ choices of extrinsic and intrinsic motives do not vary 
according to tax error magnitude. Implications for tax authorities and tax researchers are discussed. 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
There is growing acceptance among tax researchers that taxpayer decision-making is complex and 
nuanced, and based on both extrinsic and intrinsic factors (Alm, Kirchler & Muehlbacher, 2012; 
Alm & Torgler, 2011; Feld & Frey, 2002). An individual who is motivated extrinsically expects 
to receive a benefit or avoid a punishment from an external source, whereas an individual who is 
motivated intrinsically is prompted to act for reasons of personal morality or internal feelings of 
satisfaction (Ryan & Deci, 2000).  In the tax context, it follows that taxpayers may be motivated 
extrinsically or intrinsically to comply with a tax authority.  From a tax authority perspective, 
appealing to taxpayers’ intrinsic motivations rather than extrinsic motivations may be a lower-cost 
alternative, since it would not require the same human resources to detect and subsequently 
respond to a discovery of non-compliance.  Given that tax authorities worldwide are increasingly 
facing budgetary restrictions, with 60% of tax authorities reporting reductions in staffing in recent 
years (OECD 2015a), developing a better understanding of taxpayers’ intrinsic motivations 
relative to extrinsic motivations may be a useful objective. 
 
Although tax researchers suggest that taxpayers have intrinsic motivations to comply with tax 
authorities (Alm, Kirchler & Muehlbacher, 2012; Alm & Torgler, 2011; Braithwaite, 2009; Dunn, 
Farrar & Hausserman, 2016; Frey, 1997), much remains to be understood about taxpayers’ 
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intrinsic motivations.  As McKerchar, Bloomquist & Pope (2013, p.6) state, “Many have attempted 
to shed light on taxpayers’ internal motivations… but hard evidence is difficult to find.”  Dwenger, 
Kleven, Rasul & Rincke (2016) acknowledge that relative to extrinsic motivations, intrinsic 
motivations are the hardest to measure and study empirically, and therefore the least well 
understood. 
 
The purpose of this research is to develop a better understanding of extrinsic and intrinsic 
motivations in taxpayer decision-making.  We develop this understanding by examining taxpayers’ 
attitudes towards making a tax amnesty disclosure, following an unintentional tax reporting error.3  
Tax amnesties and voluntary disclosure programs are relatively low-cost compliance initiatives in 
which taxpayers are given the opportunity to self-correct errors on previously filed tax returns.  A 
tax amnesty tends to be a one-time opportunity for self-correction with an expiry date, whereas 
voluntary disclosure programs are permanent and ongoing.4  By self-correcting, taxpayers pay the 
taxes that would have resulted had the amounts been correctly reported, usually with interest, but 
can avoid the penalties and/or sanctions that would have been imposed had the tax authority 
discovered the errors. Forty-seven countries now offer permanent amnesty programs (OECD 
2015b), which suggests that tax authorities view the tax amnesty as an increasingly important tax 
compliance initiative.  
 
Empirical studies suggest that amnesties have direct and indirect effects on tax revenues. 
Nevertheless, many studies suggest that tax amnesties are not particularly effective at encouraging 
participation in tax amnesties, resulting in net revenue gains from amnesty programs that are only 
modest at best.  For example, Hasseldine (1998) analyzed a number of state tax amnesties in the 
United States, and found that amnesty revenues range from just 0.008 to 2 percent of state tax 
revenues.  Moreover, these studies tend to assume that taxpayers consider only the economic costs 
and benefits of self-correction decisions (i.e. extrinsic factors), and therefore overlook non-
economic factors (i.e. intrinsic factors) that may contribute to participation in tax amnesties.  
Perhaps tax amnesties would be more effective at generating revenue and increasing subsequent 
compliance if intrinsic motives were better understood and incorporated into the design of tax 
amnesties.   
 
In this exploratory study, we address two primary research questions, as follows: 1) Which 
extrinsic and intrinsic motives have the greatest influence on taxpayers’ decisions to correct a tax 
error?; and 2) How does tax error magnitude impact these decisions? Since empirical research 
suggests that individuals justify dishonesty in small amounts, but less so in large amounts (Ariely 
2008; Mazar, Amir & Ariely, 2008), we believe it is important to understand taxpayers’ 
motivations across different error thresholds.  We use a quasi-experimental conjoint approach to 
investigate the relative importance of various extrinsic motives within a set of extrinsic motives, 
and the relative importance of various intrinsic motives within a set of intrinsic motives.  Conjoint 
analysis is a statistical technique which determines how individuals choose among alternatives.  
                                                 
3 We focus on unintentional errors because the research is exploratory and we wanted to appeal to a broad base of 
taxpayers.  Although tax authorities hope to encourage taxpayers who made unintentional and intentional errors to 
participate in amnesty programs, it would be unrealistic to ask participants questions about a scenario in which they 
were told to assume that they had purposefully evaded taxes.  
4 In this article, we use the term ‘tax amnesty’ to refer to any program offered by a tax authority for taxpayers to self-
correct past errors.   
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Participants were given combinations of extrinsic and intrinsic motives, and asked which 
combination would be most effective at convincing them to report their mistake.  Our research is 
quasi-experimental, as we vary the error magnitude among participants in three ways ($500, 
$5,000, and $50,000). Since the conjoint analysis methodology does not allow for examination of 
relative importance across factors, we also conduct a supplemental analysis to examine the relative 
importance of extrinsic versus intrinsic motivations. For this supplemental analysis, a different set 
of participants allocate points based on how important each of the eight factors would be in their 
decision, without regard to whether they are intrinsic or extrinsic. 
 
We find that desire to avoid a penalty was the most important extrinsic motive, and responsibility 
for paying taxes owed was the most important intrinsic motive.  Collectively, extrinsic (intrinsic) 
motives accounted for approximately 66% (34%) of the amnesty participation decision.  We also 
find that taxpayers’ relative preferences for extrinsic and intrinsic motives did not vary 
significantly according to error magnitudes.  Thus, taxpayers’ motivations for self-corrections 
appear stable, regardless of the size of their error. 
 
This research contributes to the tax compliance literature by: identifying the most important 
extrinsic and intrinsic motives in a self-correction decision; by examining taxpayers’ relative 
preferences within each set of motives; and by considering the role of error magnitude in 
compliance decisions.  Existing research that investigates how intrinsic motives impact tax 
amnesties is limited (Rechberger et al., 2010; Torgler & Schaltegger, 2005), and empirical tax 
amnesty research tends to focus on subsequent income reporting or subsequent revenue collection 
effects, rather than on the reasons why taxpayers might be inclined to participate in a tax amnesty.  
In other words, tax amnesty research tends to be reactive rather than proactive, since it examines 
the after-effects of tax amnesties.  In contrast, the present research contributes to this literature by 
examining taxpayer attitudes and intentions when an amnesty participation decision is 
contemplated. Our results should also be of interest to tax authorities looking to design or improve 
revenue collection through tax amnesties.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we conduct a literature 
review, followed by sections that describe our methodology and results, and discuss the 
implications of our findings for tax policy makers and tax researchers. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Universally, people are concerned with motivation, i.e., how to move themselves or others to act 
(Deci, 2016).  While there are a number of possible theoretical frameworks that could be used to 
examine the tax amnesty decision, we explore this decision from the perspective of intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivations. A well-established psychology literature indicates that motivation can be 
either extrinsic (external to an individual, such as a third-party reward) or intrinsic (within an 
individual, such as self-esteem) (e.g., Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999; Franco & Svensgaard, 2012; 
Ryan & Deci, 2000; Ryan, 2012; Sheldon & Kasser, 2008).  Extrinsic and intrinsic motivations 
each affect economic decision-making (Gneezy, Meier, & Rey-Biel, 2011; Kakinaka & Kotani, 
2011).  Different regions of the brain are responsible for processing each type of motivation 
(Murayama, Matsumoto, Izuma, & Matsumoto, 2010). 
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The purpose of this literature review is to identify possible extrinsic and intrinsic motives that may 
be associated with tax amnesty decision-making.  To this end, we peruse the empirical literatures 
on tax amnesties specifically, and tax compliance more broadly.  We also searched the broader 
ethical decision-making and customer service literatures, since a decision to self-correct is an 
ethical decision, and involves a service interaction with a tax authority.  Finally, we reviewed 
descriptions of past and current tax amnesty programs to isolate motives that could be relevant for 
tax amnesty decision-making. 
 
Tax Amnesty Literature 
 
Empirical studies have addressed two main ways in which amnesties can affect tax revenue 
collected: direct gains from participation in the amnesty (Alm and Beck, 1991; Fisher et al., 1989; 
Hasseldine, 1998; Luitel & Sobel, 2007), and indirect effects on tax compliance following an 
amnesty (Alm et al., 1990; Alm & Beck, 1993; Andreoni, 1991; Christian et al., 2002; López-
Laborda & Rodrigo, 2003; Luna et al., 2006; Malik & Schwab, 1991; Rechberger et al., 2010; 
Torgler & Schaltegger, 2005; Young, 1994).  This literature focuses on the impact of post-amnesty 
revenue collection, or taxpayers' compliance subsequent to an amnesty, rather than on taxpayers’ 
underlying motivations to actually participate in an amnesty program.  Nevertheless, the findings 
of each study are now briefly described, with a view to identifying possible motives that may be 
influential in the tax amnesty participation decision. 
 
Fisher et al. (1989) examine the effectiveness of a state tax amnesty in Michigan, and find that 
overall revenues did not increase substantially due to the amnesty.  Alm & Beck (1991) develop 
an economic model of amnesty participation, test it using data from twenty-eight states in the 
United States, and find that taxpayers disclose more in an amnesty program when probability of 
detection and penalties are expected to be greater.  Hasseldine (1998) reviews 43 state tax amnesty 
programs in the United States, finds that tax amnesty revenues as a percentage of state tax revenues 
range from 0.008 to 2 percent, and finds that revenue collection declines with repeated amnesty 
programs.  Luitel & Sobel (2007) find that states that offer repeated tax amnesties generate less 
revenue from the subsequent amnesties than the initial tax amnesties, and find reduced compliance 
following tax amnesties. Alm et al. (1990) also find that compliance decreases after an amnesty. 
 
One economic model developed by Andreoni (1991) predicts that cheating increases when a 
permanent tax amnesty is enacted.  Similarly, Malik & Schwab (1991)’s economic model shows 
that taxpayers report less income as the probability of an amnesty rises.  Alm & Beck (1993) 
conduct a time-series economic analysis on a Colorado state tax amnesty, and suggest that this 
amnesty did not result in significant long-term post-amnesty revenue collection.  Young (1994) 
examined characteristics of amnesty participants, and found that single males, and individuals with 
occupations in sales or who were self-employed, were more likely to participate in tax amnesties.  
Christian et al. (2002) found that the increase in tax revenues following a Michigan state tax 
amnesty was negligible.  López-Laborda & Rodrigo (2003) evaluated the long-term impact of a 
Spanish tax amnesty, and found that the amnesty had no effect on tax collection in the short- or 
long-term.  Torgler & Schaltegger (2005) experimentally examined the effect of taxpayers’ voting 
approval for a tax amnesty on subsequent reporting compliance, and found that tax compliance 
increased only after group discussion and voting.  Luna et al. (2006) review a number of state tax 
amnesties, identify features of each, and conclude that the long-term compliance effect is unclear.  
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Rechberger et al. (2010) examine the perceived justice of a tax amnesty on subsequent reporting 
compliance, and found that this relation is mediated by retribution and value restoration.     
 
These studies tend to conclude that revenue collection effects of amnesties are modest at best, and 
that reporting compliance following an amnesty tends to suffer.  Amnesties generate relatively 
little revenue in part because participation in amnesties is low.  Our research focuses on 
antecedents of participation, which has the potential to improve revenue collection. Only one study 
(Alm & Beck, 1991) explicitly identifies possible motives that might influence taxpayer 
participation in tax amnesties.  Alm & Beck (1991) conclude that probability of detection and 
penalties are important motives.  For the majority of studies, the reason(s) taxpayers participate in 
tax amnesties is (are) not stated, and is (are) implied to be economic in nature.  Consequently, 
much remains to be learned as to why taxpayers might be inclined to participate in a tax amnesty 
program. 
 
Other Tax Compliance Literature 
 
Consistent with the tax amnesty literature, conventional economic models of tax compliance 
suggest that the compliance decision is an economic decision, such that taxpayers weigh economic 
gains from evasion with possible sanctions from having their evasion detected and identified by 
the tax authority (e.g., Sandmo, 2005).  In other words, the tax evasion decision is a function of 
detection likelihood, the size of the penalty, and the individual’s degree of risk aversion (Slemrod, 
2007).  Thus, likelihood of detection, penalties, and risk tolerance are relevant for tax reporting 
compliance decisions, and may also be relevant for self-correction decisions.   
 
A number of tax studies have also considered how tax morale impacts tax compliance (see Torgler, 
2007, for a review).  Tax morale is, “the collective name for all the non-rational factors and 
motivations – such as social norms, personal values, and various cognitive processes – that 
strongly affect an individual’s voluntary compliance with laws” (Kornhauser, 2007, p. 602).  Tax 
morale is synonymous with intrinsic motivation to pay taxes (McKerchar et al., 2013).  The tax 
morale literature suggests that perceptions of fairness, trust in government, exchange equity, 
culture, and moral rules and sentiments all impact tax morale (e.g., Alm & Torgler, 2006; Frey & 
Torgler, 2007; McKerchar et al., 2013; Pope & McKerchar, 2011).  Thus, these factors may also 
influence taxpayers’ decisions to participate in a tax amnesty.   
 
We also consulted tax compliance literature reviews to identify possible factors that may also be 
relevant for tax amnesty decision-making (Andreoni, Erard, & Feinstein, 1998; Cuccia, 1994; 
Fischer, Wartick, & Mark, 1992; Jackson & Milliron, 1986).  Sanctions (penalties) and probability 
of detection were the predominant factors that were identified, along with other factors of guilt 
and social norms.  All of these factors may affect taxpayers’ extrinsic or intrinsic motivations.  
Other factors that affected tax compliance in these studies, such as demographic variables, are not 
inherently intrinsic or extrinsic, and thus we did not include them as possible extrinsic or intrinsic 
motives in the study, but rather measured and controlled for them when relevant. 
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Ethical Decision-Making and Customer Service Literatures 
 
To identify other motives that may influence the tax amnesty decision, we examine the broader 
ethical decision-making and customer service literatures.5  We identified guilt, embarrassment and 
moral pride as motives relevant to ethical decision-making (Tangney, Steuwig & Mashek, 2007), 
as well as personal responsibility and peer reaction (Bobek, Hageman & Kelliher, 2013).  Luria, 
Gal & Yagil (2009) identify belief that an individual will be treated fairly and ease of making 
restitution as additional factors that may influence individuals’ willingness to report customer 
service complaints.  Since taxpayers receive some degree of customer service when they interact 
with a tax authority, factors that influence customer service interactions may also be relevant for 
tax amnesty decisions.    
 
Tax Amnesty Program Descriptions 
 
We also read descriptions of tax amnesty programs worldwide (Baer & Le Borgne, 2008; 
Malherbe, 2011; OECD, 2015b) to identify other motives that could be relevant.  Items that 
emerged related to: elapsed time; whether or not the taxpayer had the financial means to make 
restitution; the size of the penalty; and the amount of interest owing. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Our research questions concern the relative importance of extrinsic and intrinsic motives to 
taxpayers when contemplating participation in a tax amnesty, and how their preferences for 
extrinsic and intrinsic motives vary according to the magnitude of their tax error.  We address these 
questions using a quasi-experimental conjoint methodology.  In the subsections that follow, we 
describe conjoint analysis, how we determined the extrinsic and intrinsic motives to use in the 
conjoint analysis, the experimental procedures, and the results. 
 
Conjoint Analysis 
 
In this section, we describe the conjoint analysis that we conducted to assess and understand the 
roles of extrinsic and intrinsic motives in tax amnesty decision-making.  Conjoint analysis is a 
statistical technique, used most often in marketing research, to understand individuals’ preferences 
for product features.  A product has attributes (such as colour and size), and each attribute has 
several features (such as red, blue, and green colours; and small and large sizes).  Conjoint analysis 
allows researchers to determine which combinations of product features are most preferred by 
consumers.  Conjoint analysis helps researchers understand how consumers make choices among 
competing product features. 
 
Conjoint statistical software computes a “part-worth utility” (a numerical value) for each feature 
of each attribute.  Part-worth utilities of a particular product feature can be compared within each 
attribute to assess respondents’ relative preferences of a product feature; and part-worth utilities 
from one attribute can be combined with part-worth utilities from another attribute, and compared 
with other similar combinations.  Thus, in the above example, part-worth utilities from one colour 
                                                 
5 Using the ABI/Inform database, we searched ethics, hospitality, and marketing journals for the terms ‘motivation’ 
and ‘motive’. 
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could be compared with part-worth utilities of all other colours; and a part-worth utility from a 
colour could be combined with a part-worth utility from a size, and compared to any other similar 
combination.  However, part-worth utilities from one attribute cannot be compared with part-worth 
utilities from another attribute (Orme, 2010).  Thus, in the above example, a part-worth utility of 
a colour could not be compared with a part-worth utility of a size.  
 
While conjoint analysis tends to be used in marketing research, tax researchers have also employed 
this method, though not with respect to tax amnesty decisions (O’Neil, 1982; Blaufus, Bob, 
Hundsdoerfer, Kiesewetter & Weimann, 2013; Blaufus & Ortlieb, 2009; Hundsdoerfer & 
Sichtmann, 2009; Milliron & Toy, 1988; O’Neil, 1982).  We examine the tax amnesty decision 
using a motivational psychology framework, in which there are two underlying attributes (extrinsic 
motivation and intrinsic motivation), with several features of each attribute (corresponding to 
specific extrinsic and intrinsic motives). 
 
There are several advantages to using the conjoint methodology for this study. Conjoint analysis 
is a powerful way in which to analyze the relative importance of multiple features simultaneously.  
This method requires respondents to consider multiple attributes of their decision simultaneously, 
such that they must make trade-offs between different motives.  Conjoint analysis also allows us 
to examine a larger number of motives than a traditional experiment, which is important, given the 
exploratory nature of the research.  However, there is a restriction on the number of features each 
attribute can have; specifically, the number of features per attribute should not exceed four (Orme, 
2010).  Therefore, we are limited to including four extrinsic motives and four intrinsic motives in 
the conjoint analysis.   
 
Selection of Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motives 
 
To determine the four extrinsic and four intrinsic motives for use in the conjoint analysis, we 
initially compiled lists of 10 extrinsic and 11 intrinsic motives, using the findings from our 
literature review.  Along with another academic, we independently categorized each motive we 
identified from the literature review as extrinsic or intrinsic, and reached a consensus as to the final 
classification.6    
 
To validate our selection of motives, as well as our categorization of these motives as extrinsic and 
intrinsic, and to identify the four most influential motives across both categories, we conducted a 
pretest.  Pretests are used commonly in behavioral research to substantiate an initial selection of 
items for use in a questionnaire, as well as to check for glitches in wording (e.g., Hite, 1998; Libby 
& Thorne, 2007).  
 
The pretest was conducted on 65 adult students (average age of 28.8 years) in two tax classes.7  
Participants read a brief background about tax amnesties, were given a list of motives, and were 
                                                 
6 We were unable to reach consensus as to the extrinsic or intrinsic nature of two factors (the amount of the mistake, 
and the amount of time that has passed since the mistake).  To determine whether a typical taxpayer thought these 
would be intrinsic or extrinsic motivations, we surveyed participants in our pretest (see footnote 8).  Regardless, this 
issue is not relevant, as neither factor was retained for the conjoint analysis.  
7 The sample does not need to be the same as the population, as long as there is nothing in the sample that is expected 
to bias the results (Elliott, Hodge, Kennedy, & Pronk, 2007).  Nothing about the pretest sample was expected to bias 
the results.  
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asked to rank them in terms of their importance in the tax amnesty decision.8  They were then 
asked if there were any additional reasons that were not listed that would be influential in this 
decision, and if any wording or any factors were unclear, which helped us to further refine the 
wording used, and helped to ensure that we had not overlooked other important motives.  No 
additional motives were identified. 
 
The pretest results (not tabulated) indicated that the most important extrinsic motives were: 
wanting to avoid a penalty; the size of the penalty; probability of the error being detected by the 
tax authority; and effort to disclose.9 There was also agreement that the most important intrinsic 
motives were: responsibility to pay the taxes owed; satisfaction for correcting the mistake; feeling 
guilty for not paying the tax; and concern about how the taxpayer would be treated.     
 
Below, we tabulate the initial lists of motives, classified as extrinsic or intrinsic, and indicate in 
bold font the four extrinsic and four intrinsic motives retained for our subsequent conjoint study. 
 
  
                                                 
8 To cross-validate the pretest results, one class was given a list of all possible motives, while the other class was given 
lists of extrinsic and intrinsic motives separately.   Using two groups of students provides greater assurance regarding 
the consistency of their rankings of the most important motives.  We compared results from both classes, which were 
largely consistent (see footnote 9), i.e., the most important extrinsic and intrinsic motives were ranked similarly across 
both classes. At the end of the pretest, participants were also provided with a definition of intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation, and asked whether they thought two ambiguous items (the amount of the mistake and the amount of time 
that has passed since the mistake, were primarily intrinsic or primarily extrinsic. 
9 One class rated amount of the mistake just higher than effort to disclose, but we retained effort to disclose, since the 
size of the penalty is a function of the amount of the mistake, and the two items could be confounded. 
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Table 1 – Initial list of extrinsic and intrinsic motives when contemplating a tax amnesty 
disclosure * 
 
 Extrinsic motives Intrinsic motives 
1) Concern about other people’s opinion of 
me for not paying the tax. 
 Feeling guilty about not paying the tax. 
 
2) The amount of time that has passed since 
the mistake. 
Feeling guilty about making the mistake. 
3) The length of time that the voluntary 
disclosure program is available. 
 Feeling embarrassed for not paying the tax. 
4) The size of the penalty.  Feeling embarrassed for making the mistake. 
5) Wanting to avoid paying a penalty.  Feeling embarrassed if the mistake is 
discovered by the tax authority. 
6) The amount of interest. Feeling satisfaction for paying the tax. 
7) The amount of the mistake. Feeling satisfaction for correcting the 
mistake. 
8) Concern that paying the amount owed 
will affect my lifestyle. 
Feeling responsibility to pay the taxes 
owed. 
9) The amount of effort required to 
disclose my mistake. 
Feeling responsibility to pay taxes in 
general. 
10) The chance that I'll get caught in the 
future if I don't admit my mistake now. 
Feeling uncertainty about being detected by 
the tax authority. 
11)  Concern about how the tax authority will 
treat me if I admit my mistake. 
* Note: items in bold font represent items retained for use in the conjoint analysis. 
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Procedures 
 
We perform a choice-based conjoint analysis, using the shortlists of four extrinsic and four intrinsic 
motives, to gauge the relative importance of each motive within their respective motivation 
categories.  Our design is a fractional-factorial design, in which selections of combinations of 
motives are presented to the respondents.  A full-factorial design, in which all combinations are 
presented to participants, is impractical due to respondent fatigue, so fractional-factorial designs 
are used instead, and are just as effective as full-factorial designs (Tovares, Boatwright, & Cagan, 
2014).   
 
Respondents were United States taxpayers recruited from a large market research firm, and chosen 
randomly from across the United States, but segmented according to gender and age (individuals 
at least 18 years of age).  Respondents read a brief background about tax amnesty programs, 
followed by a vignette in which they were asked to imagine that they had made an unintentional 
mistake on their tax return (either $500, $5,000, or $50,000), and were then presented with a series 
of screens that presented three choice combinations per screen.  Each choice combination had one 
extrinsic and one intrinsic motive.10  Respondents were asked which combination of the three 
would be most effective at convincing them to report their mistake to the tax authority.  Their 
answer determined, in part, which combinations appeared on the next screen, as programmed by 
the software.  A sample screenshot is below in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 – Sample screenshot 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 We acknowledge that tax amnesty decisions are not comprised of exactly one intrinsic and one extrinsic motive, 
but in order to determine the relative importance of the intrinsic and extrinsic motives using conjoint analysis, this set-
up is required. To address the concern that the decision may not be based on one extrinsic and one intrinsic motive, 
we conducted a supplemental analysis, in which participants freely indicated the importance of each motive without 
regard to whether it was extrinsic or intrinsic. 
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It is important to examine how taxpayers’ motivational preferences may vary across different error 
thresholds.  Ariely (2008) and Mazar, Amir, & Ariely (2008) suggest and find evidence that 
individuals can justify dishonesty in small amounts without compromising a positive view of 
themselves, but not in large amounts.  Consequently, taxpayers with relatively small errors may 
be motivated differently than taxpayers with relatively large errors.   
 
We were unable to find any guidance in the academic literature on choices of dollar magnitudes 
for use in an experiment.  Although our choices of dollar magnitudes are subjective, we used the 
vignette development suggestions of Weber (1992) and Hughes & Huby (2004), who emphasize 
that vignettes must be as realistic as possible.  We chose an upper limit of $50,000, after consulting 
an industry publication which reports dollar amounts of frauds, as well as considering anecdotal 
evidence reported in the business press, and used our pretest to verify that this amount was 
plausible to respondents.11  Once we chose the upper limit, we chose the other two amounts ($5,000 
and $500) as equidistant intervals on a logarithmic scale.   
 
A total of 1,266 taxpayers completed the instrument.  To ensure high data quality, the instrument 
contained two ‘attention check’ questions.12  Respondents who failed one or both of these 
questions were terminated, and their responses were not included in the final tally.  The average 
age of a respondent was 45.3 years, and 52.1% of the sample was female.  Detailed demographic 
information is contained in Table 2.  
 
To gauge the effectiveness of the error magnitude manipulation, respondents were asked to rate 
their agreement with the following statement: The amount of taxes owed was quite large.  
Respondents rated this statement on a 7-point Likert scale, where 1=strongly disagree and 
7=strongly agree.  The mean scores for respondents in the $500, $5,000, and $50,000 conditions 
were 3.87, 5.80, and 6.61, respectively, which are in the expected direction.  Furthermore, Mann-
Whitney U-tests showed significant differences in these scores between the $500 and $5,000 
groups (Z=15.53, p<0.01), and between the $5,000 and $50,000 groups (Z=10.61, p<0.01).  
Therefore, the error magnitudes were effectively manipulated across conditions. 
 
 
                                                 
11 We consulted the “Report to the Nation” of the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE 2014), which 
reported a median dollar amount for intentional mistakes of $145,000.  Our upper threshold of $50,000 is well below 
this median figure, as we felt that taxpayers would have difficulty relating to any higher amount as an unintentional 
mistake.  Furthermore, our upper threshold of $50,000 appears plausible, given stories in the American popular press 
of two potential government appointees who made unintentional tax errors in the amounts of $34,000 and $140,000 
(Reuters, 2009).  None of the pretest participants expressed concern over an upper limit of $50,000.   
12 One question was, “In the scenario, how much did it say you owe in taxes?”  Respondents could choose between a) 
$500, b) $5,000, or c) $50,000.  The correct answer depended upon experimental condition.  The other question was, 
“In the scenario, what was the reason provided for why you owe taxes?”  The options were: a) you intentionally made 
a mistake in the past; b) you unintentionally made a mistake in the past; and c) the IRS made a mistake, and as a result, 
you owe more in taxes.  
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Table 2 – Demographic profile statistics  
 $500 error  $5,000 error  $50,000 error  All responses 
Sample size 423 422 421 1,266 
Gender 
  male 
 female 
 
197 (46.6%) 
226 (53.4%) 
 
211 (50.0%) 
211 (50.0%) 
 
199 (47.3%) 
222 (52.7%) 
 
607 (47.9%) 
659 (52.1%) 
Age 43.9 44.8  47.4 45.3 
Education 
 less than high school 
 high school  
 some college courses 
 college graduate 
 post-graduate degree 
 
3 (0.7%) 
75 (17.7%) 
129 (30.5%) 
151 (35.7%) 
65 (15.4%) 
 
3 (0.7%) 
71 (16.8%) 
140 (33.2%) 
140 (33.2%) 
68 (16.1%) 
 
7 (1.7%) 
71 (16.9%) 
154 (36.6%) 
122 (29.0%) 
67 (15.9%) 
 
13 (1.0%) 
217 (17.1%) 
423 (33.4%) 
413 (32.6%) 
200 (15.8%) 
Income 
 less than $25,000 
 $25,000 to $49,999 
 $50,000 - $74,999 
 $75,000 - $99,999 
 Over $100,000 
 Prefer not to respond 
 
75 (17.7% 
126 (29.8%) 
85 (20.1%) 
72 (17.0%) 
57 (13.5%) 
8 (1.9%) 
 
80 (19.0%) 
107 (25.4%) 
89 (21.1%) 
59 (14.0%) 
80 (19.0%) 
7 (1.7%) 
 
95 (22.6%) 
107 (25.4%) 
82 (19.5%) 
53 (12.6%) 
79 (18.8%) 
5 (1.2%) 
 
250 (19.7%) 
340 (26.9%) 
256 (20.2%) 
184 (14.5%) 
216 (17.1%) 
20 (1.6%) 
Ever made a tax 
amnesty disclosure? 
  yes 
  no 
 
 
16 (3.8%) 
407 (96.2%) 
 
 
26 (6.2%) 
396 (93.8%) 
 
 
11 (2.6%) 
410 (97.4%) 
 
 
53 (4.2%) 
1,213 (95.8%) 
 
RESULTS 
 
We first examined which extrinsic and intrinsic motives have the greatest influence on taxpayers’ 
decisions to correct a tax error (Research Question 1).  To address this question, we examined the 
part-worth utilities of each motive.  We then take the antilog of the part-worth utilities in order to 
express them as a proportion, so that we can predict the percentage of the population that is 
influenced by each attribute (Sawtooth Software, 2002).  The average from all respondents of the 
part-worth utilities, the antilogs, and the relative percentages are presented in Table 3. 
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Table 3 – Part-worth utility scores for extrinsic and intrinsic motives 
Factor $500 error $5,000 error $50,000 error MANOVA 
between groups Part-
worth 
utility 
antilog Percentage Part-
worth 
utility 
antilog Percentage Part-
worth 
utility 
antilog Percentage 
EXTRINSIC 
Avoiding a 
penalty 
0.92 2.50 51.76% 0.94 2.57 52.76% 0.98 2.68 53.67% F=1.04, p=0.35 
Future detection 0.04 1.04 21.53% 0.02 1.02 21.02% 0.03 1.03 20.65% F=0.04, p=0.96 
Penalty size -0.18 0.83 17.18% -0.21 0.81 16.58% -0.15 0.86 17.20% F=1.26, p=0.28 
Effort -0.78 0.46 9.53% -0.76 0.47 9.64% -0.86 0.42 8.48% F=1.75, p=0.17 
 100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  
INTRINSIC 
Factor $500 error $5,000 error $50,000 error MANOVA 
between groups Part-
worth 
utility 
antilog Percentage Part-
worth 
utility 
antilog Percentage Part-
worth 
utility 
antilog Percentage 
Responsibility 0.54 1.72 39.36% 0.56 1.76 39.45% 0.61 1.84 41.25% F=0.90, p=0.41 
Satisfaction 0.26 1.30 29.75% 0.32 1.38 31.05% 0.27 1.32 29.42% F=0.60, p=0.55 
Guilt -0.27 0.76 17.47% -0.23 0.80 17.92% -0.23 0.79 17.68% F=0.61, p=0.54 
Treatment -0.53 0.59 13.42% -0.66 0.52 11.58% -0.65 0.52 11.66% F=1.02, p=0.36 
 100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  
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Results indicate that the most important extrinsic factor is the desire to avoid paying a penalty, 
followed by the probability of future detection, the size of the penalty, and the amount of effort 
required to disclose the mistake.  Overall, the desire to avoid paying a penalty was rated to be 
approximately 2.5 times more important than the next most important factor, the probability of 
future detection, and was rated just over three times more important than the size of the penalty.     
 
Results also indicate that the most important intrinsic factor is a feeling of responsibility to pay 
the taxes owed, followed by satisfaction for correcting the mistake, feeling guilty for not paying 
the tax, and concern for how the authorities would treat the taxpayer.  The responsibility factor 
was rated only slightly higher than the satisfaction factor (about 0.15 times), but responsibility 
was rated more than twice as important as guilt and almost three times as important as treatment 
by the tax authority.   
 
We then examined how tax error magnitudes impacted respondents’ choices of extrinsic and 
intrinsic motives (Research Question 2).  To address this question, we conducted a MANOVA 
of the part-worth utilities for all 8 motives across each error condition.  As the columns in Table 
3 show, there were no significant differences in part-worth utilities for any extrinsic or intrinsic 
factors.  Therefore, the relative importance of any extrinsic or intrinsic motives did not vary 
significantly by error condition.   
 
Supplemental Analysis 
 
Because conjoint analysis does not allow us to examine the relative importance of intrinsic 
versus extrinsic motives, we conducted a supplemental analysis to address this issue.  Using a 
different set of participants (also recruited from an online survey company), we presented 299 
participants with the same background information and scenario as in the conjoint analysis 
study.13 Rather than asking them to select among pairs of intrinsic and extrinsic motives, we 
asked them to allocate 100 points to each of the eight possible motives, based on how influential 
the motives would be if making a tax amnesty decision.  As in the conjoint study, we split the 
participants into three groups, according to three error magnitudes ($500, $5,000, and $50,000).  
Overall, we found that participants allocated 66% of their points to extrinsic factors and 34% 
of their points to intrinsic factors.  These findings suggest that extrinsic factors are significantly 
more important than intrinsic factors.14   
 
Similar to the conjoint study, using MANOVA, we did not find any significant differences in 
extrinsic/intrinsic allocations across error conditions at the 0.05 level of significance.15 
Therefore, this finding provides additional independent evidence that taxpayers’ motivations 
appear stable across error magnitudes.  Table 4 reports the mean extrinsic and intrinsic scores 
for this supplemental analysis, across the three error conditions.   
 
 
__________________ 
13 The average age of a respondent was 36.9 and 54% were male.  
14 Wilcoxon signed-rank tests across all three conditions were significant: in the $500 condition, Z=-5.841, p<0.01; 
in the $5,000 condition, Z=-6.407, p<0.01; and in the $50,000 condition, Z=-5.383, p<0.01. 
15 The amount of points allocated to any motive did not vary significantly across any error condition at the 0.05 
level of significance.  Furthermore, Mann-Whitney U test results are as follows: for the scores in the $500 vs. 
$5,000 condition, Z=-0.623, p=0.53; for the scores in the $5,000 vs. $50,000 condition, Z=-0.819, p=0.41; and 
for the scores in the $500 vs. $50,000 condition, p=0.87. 
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Table 4 – Allocation between extrinsic and intrinsic motives 
 All data 
(n=299) 
$500 error 
(n=102) 
$5,000 error 
(n=100) 
$50,000 error 
(n=97) 
Intrinsic only 34.16 34.46 32.34 35.71 
Extrinsic only 65.84 65.54 67.66 64.29 
 100 100 100 100 
 
 
DISCUSSION & IMPLICATIONS 
 
In this research, we provide preliminary evidence that both extrinsic and intrinsic motives 
influence taxpayer decision-making in a tax amnesty context.  Specifically, we identify and 
analyze the key extrinsic and intrinsic motives that influence taxpayers’ amnesty decisions.  
We first developed shortlists of the four most important extrinsic and intrinsic motives, 
respectively.  We then used both sets of motives in a quasi-experimental conjoint analysis, 
where we were able to determine respondents’ relative preferences for each motive within both 
categories of motivation, across three error magnitudes ($500, $5,000, and $50,000).  We found 
that desire to avoid a penalty was the most important extrinsic motive, and responsibility for 
paying the taxes owed was the most important intrinsic motive.  Our results further indicate 
that the magnitude of the tax error does not influence the relative importance of extrinsic or 
intrinsic motivational factors in tax amnesty decision-making.  Thus, taxpayers’ motivational 
preferences appear stable across tax error magnitudes.  In a supplemental analysis, we 
determined that extrinsic factors are responsible for approximately two-thirds of the decision 
to participate in a tax amnesty, whereas intrinsic factors are responsible for approximately one-
third. 
 
We extend and contribute to the literature on tax amnesties by identifying influential extrinsic 
and intrinsic motives, and by showing that intrinsic motivations have an influential albeit less 
significant role than extrinsic motivations on taxpayer’s decisions to participate in a tax 
amnesty.  We also extend the broader tax compliance literature by finding that in a tax amnesty 
context, the size of taxpayers’ errors does not seem to influence their underlying motivations 
to cooperate with a tax authority.  
 
As with all behavioral research, this study has limitations.  To prevent decision fatigue, and 
because of the constraints of conjoint analysis, the list of potential motives was not exhaustive.  
Therefore, it is possible that our results would have differed had we used additional motives.  
Also, since this study was tested on taxpayers from the United States, results should be applied 
cautiously to other jurisdictions.  Future research could consider how taxpayers in other 
countries are motivated to make amnesty disclosures, since there may be cultural differences 
that impact taxpayers’ extrinsic and intrinsic motivations.  We also acknowledge that 
participants in our study were asked about their motivations in a hypothetical scenario rather 
than in an actual situation.  Thus, our study captures participants’ intended, rather than actual, 
motivations. 
Although most of the respondents do not have direct experience with tax amnesties, it would 
be infeasible to recruit respondents who had participated, or would consider participating, in a 
tax amnesty.  However, participants in this study were able to relate to and understand the 
scenario, evidenced by correctly answering the attention check questions, and from reading the 
comments in the pretest.  Additionally, hypothetical vignettes are a useful tool when studying 
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an ethical topic with which individuals may not be personally familiar (Dunn et al., 2016; 
Weber, 1992; Hughes & Huby, 2004; Mudrack & Mason, 2013; Weber, 1992).   
 
Tax compliance researchers have suggested that a responsive regulation approach between 
taxpayers and tax authorities (Braithwaite & Braithwaite, 2001), which seeks to foster 
cooperative attitudes from taxpayers using intrinsic motivations in addition to extrinsic 
motivations, may be more effective than a traditional deterrence approach, which relies on 
extrinsic motivations.  Furthermore, Kirchler (2007), Kirchler, Hoelzl, & Wahl (2008), and 
Alm et al. (2012) suggest a “slippery slope framework” of tax compliance, in which voluntary 
compliance and enforced compliance are both present.  According to this framework, voluntary 
compliance depends on the right mix of trust in tax authorities, which is largely a function of 
intrinsic motivations, such as perceived fairness, and enforcement, such as threat of penalties.  
The results from our conjoint analysis provide support for this paradigm and additional insight 
regarding specific factors that are relevant in a tax amnesty decision.  
 
Both our conjoint study and supplemental analysis, using different samples, revealed that 
taxpayers’ intrinsic and extrinsic motivations did not significantly differ across error 
magnitudes.  This finding may suggest that it is a taxpayer's anxiety about having made an error 
that triggers specific motivational responses, rather than the amount of the error.  This 
suggestion is consistent with Bobek, Hatfield & Wentzel (2007), who found that taxpayers 
perceive satisfaction and enjoyment from receiving refunds, to the extent that they will overpay 
interim tax payments to ensure they are in a refund position when they submit their annual tax 
return.  In Bobek et al. (2007), it was the fact that taxpayers were in a refund position, rather 
than the size of the refund, that provided satisfaction.  Similarly, the reasons for correcting an 
error may not be related to the magnitude of an error, but rather to the fact that a taxpayer has 
anxiety over making an error. 
 
Another implication of our findings, specific to tax amnesties, is that authorities may be most 
likely to encourage taxpayers’ participation in an amnesty if taxpayers know that they can avoid 
penalties, since this was the most important extrinsic motive in the conjoint study.  Thus, tax 
authorities could promote tax amnesties with a message that focuses on penalty avoidance.  
Since tax authorities worldwide are increasingly adopting permanent amnesty programs 
(OECD, 2015b), promoting awareness of these initiatives will become increasingly important, 
as will tailoring a message to encourage taxpayers to self-correct.   
 
Another implication of our findings is that intrinsic motivations appear to have some role in 
taxpayers’ amnesty decision-making.  Although the role of intrinsic motivations does not 
appear to be as influential as extrinsic motivations, it may be possible for tax authorities to 
appeal to intrinsic motives, which may simultaneously enhance taxpayers’ extrinsic 
motivations and, in turn, increase the likelihood of cooperation with authorities.  Specifically, 
Frey & Jegen (2001) suggest that, in some circumstances, intrinsic motivations can enhance 
the strength of extrinsic motivations in influencing behaviour (Frey & Jegen, 2001).  While 
further research is needed to examine the joint influence of extrinsic and intrinsic motives on 
the decision to participate in a tax amnesty, given the relative lack of success of tax amnesty 
programs which rely solely on economic (extrinsic) motives, tax authorities may want to 
consider how influential intrinsic motives, such as responsibility to pay one’s taxes, can be 
paired with influential extrinsic motives, such as desire to avoid penalties, to enhance the 
effectiveness of a tax amnesty program.  We encourage further research to investigate this 
possibility. 
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